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Response inhibition refers to the suppression of prepared or initiated actions. Typically, the go/no-go task (GNGT)
or the stop signal task (SST) are used interchangeably to capture individual differences in response inhibition. On
the one hand, factor analytic and conjunction neuroimaging studies support the association of both tasks with a
single inhibition construct. On the other hand, studies that directly compare the two tasks indicate distinct
mechanisms, corresponding to action restraint and cancellation in the GNGT and SST, respectively. We addressed
these contradictory findings with the aim to identify the core differences in the temporal dynamics of the func-
tional networks that are recruited in both tasks. We extracted the time-courses of sensory, motor, attentional, and
cognitive control networks by group independent component (G-ICA) analysis of electroencephalography (EEG)
data from both tasks. Additionally, electromyography (EMG) from the responding effector muscles was recorded
to detect the timing of response inhibition. The results indicated that inhibitory performance in the GNGT may be
comparable to response selection mechanisms, reaching peripheral muscles at around 316 ms. In contrast,
inhibitory performance in the SST is achieved via biasing of the sensorimotor system in preparation for stopping,
followed by fast sensory, motor and frontal integration during outright stopping. Inhibition can be detected at the
peripheral level at 140 ms after stop stimulus presentation. The GNGT and the SST therefore seem to recruit
widely different neural dynamics, implying that the interchangeable use of superficially similar inhibition tasks in
both basic and clinical research is unwarranted.1. Introduction
Response inhibition is fundamental for purposeful behavior, enabling
us to adapt rapidly to changes in the environment. By a strict definition,
response inhibition refers to the suppression of a prepared or initiated
action. In its broader context, inhibitory control relies on a cascade of
neural processes that ultimately result in the suppression of behavior,
including signal detection and discrimination, response preparation,
interference control, and, eventually, response inhibition. It is likely then,
that successful inhibition depends on the fine-tuned interaction of multiple
control systems, depending on the specific task requirements or strategies.
Yet, the majority of the scientific literature as well as neuropsychological
tests treat the plethora of available inhibition tasks interchangeably,
inherently presuming that response inhibition is a unitary construct.gy, University of Oslo, Norway A
aud).
2
January 2020; Accepted 23 Jan
vier Inc. This is an open access aThe most common behavioral paradigms to measure response inhibi-
tion are the go/no-go task (GNGT) and the stop signal task (SST). In both
paradigms, the primary task is either a simple or a choice reaction task. In
the GNGT, a proportion of the stimuli are replaced with a no-go stimulus,
while in the SST, the go stimulus is always shown first, but may then be
followed by a stop stimulus after a short stop signal delay (SSD). Both the
no-go and the stop stimulus instruct the participant not to respond, despite
the prepared or possibly initiated go response. The defining difference
between the two tasks is thus the timing of the inhibition signal relative to
the go signal (0 and ~300 ms for the GNGT and SST, respectively).
It is controversial whether the GNGT and SST activate the same or
different inhibitory mechanisms. A distinction has been proposed where
the GNGT captures action restraint, whereas the SST relies on action
cancellation (Schachar et al., 2007). Action restraint in the GNGT refers
to a decision of whether or not to respond. In contrast, there is no suchddress: P.O box 1904, Blindern, 0317, Oslo, Norway.
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Abbreviations
GNGT go/no-go task
G-ICA group independent component analysis
IC independent component
prEMG partial response electromyography
rERP regression event related potential
SSD stop signal delay
SSRT stop signal reaction time
SST stop signal task
L. Raud et al. NeuroImage 210 (2020) 116582decision in the SST as the default decision is always to respond, so action
cancellation refers to the suppression of this already initiated response.
Behavioral evidence supports the dissociation of these mechanisms, as
performance in one task can deteriorate without apparent deficits in the
other (Kr€amer et al., 2013; Littman and Takacs, 2017). Pharmacological
manipulations suggest that action restraint relies on serotonergic and
action cancellation on noradrenergic neurotransmitter signaling (Eagle
et al., 2008). However, a recent factor analytic study found that among
the plethora of tasks commonly used to investigate inhibitory control, the
GNGT and SST strongly loaded on a single factor (Bender et al., 2016).
Similarly, human functional neuroimaging studies that compare the two
tasks indicate functional convergence within a single inhibitory control
network that encompasses inferior frontal (IFC) and/or insular cortex,
middle frontal cortex, (pre-) supplementary motor area (pre-SMA),
cingulate cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and posterior parietal
regions (Cai et al., 2014; Dambacher et al., 2014; McNab et al., 2008; Nee
et al., 2007; Rubia et al., 2001; Sebastian et al., 2013; Swick et al., 2011;
Zheng et al., 2008). However, many of these studies additionally report
the engagement of task-specific networks.
EEG is well suited for resolving the train of cognitive processes at a
fine temporal scale. A majority of response inhibition findings has
focused on the event related potentials (ERPs) N2 and P3, which are
elicited reliably in both the GNGT and the SST (e.g. Bekker et al., 2005;
De Jong et al., 1990; Huster et al., 2013; Kok et al., 2004). The P3 onset,
particularly, has been proposed as the marker for inhibition (Wessel and
Aron, 2015). When the two tasks are compared directly, the P3 amplitude
tends to be larger in the SST than in the GNGT (Cunillera et al., 2015;
Enriquez-Geppert et al., 2010; Johnstone et al., 2007). Further, Wessel
(2018) manipulated the task parameters of the GNGT and found that the
stop-related P3 was elicited in the GNGT only if the probability of no-go
stimuli was low and the task pace was fast enough to evoke a prepotent
response tendency. However, others have argued that the P3 appears too
late to index a genuine inhibitory process (Filipovic et al., 2000; Huster
et al., 2019; Raud and Huster, 2017; Skippen et al., 2019). While the P3
onset is typically detected at around 200–300 ms, corticomotor excit-
ability is reduced already at around 150 ms inhibitory signal onset
(Coxon et al., 2006; Fujiyama et al., 2011; Hoshiyama et al., 1997, 1996;
Macdonald et al., 2014; van Campen et al., 2013; van den Wildenberg
et al., 2010; Yamanaka et al., 2002). This coincides with the estimation of
inhibition latencies of around 150 ms from partial response electromy-
ography (prEMG) indices (Raud and Huster, 2017). PrEMG refers to EMG
bursts in trials where no overt button press is registered. These have been
observed in a number of conflict tasks and are often considered erroneous
response activations that are inhibited before they fully develop into an
error (hence the previously used term ‘partial error’; Burle et al., 2002;
Hasbroucq et al., 1999; Rochet et al., 2014). In the SST, however, these
bursts indicate correct response activation in reaction to the go signal
that then gets cancelled in response to the stop signal (Atsma et al., 2018;
De Jong et al., 1990; Raud; Huster, 2017). Correspondingly, while the
onset latency of such EMG reflects response initiation, the starting point
for its decline (quantified as the prEMG peak latency) may indicate the
time-point of inhibitory effects in the periphery.2
The focus on the N2 and P3 in the response inhibition literature may
stem from the fact that these components are relatively large in ampli-
tude and thus tend to dominate over other EEG markers of different
stages of cognitive processing. Studies that attempt to de-mix the various
sources of EEG activity report a much richer set of activations, particu-
larly in early time-windows just after the presentation of the inhibitory
signal (Albares et al., 2014; Huster et al., 2017, 2014). Additionally,
recent studies highlight the importance of other supporting processes for
successful inhibition, such as an attentional bias towards fast stimulus
detection (Langford et al., 2016a, 2016b; Skippen et al., 2019) or motor
preparation processes (Liebrand et al., 2018).
To summarize, the GNGT and SST seem to load on a single inhibition
construct based on behavioral factor analyses, and they also activate
overlapping brain regions. In contrast, pharmacological manipulations
indicate separate mechanisms for the two tasks, paralleled by unique
brain activations for either task in addition to the joint activations. These
contradictory findings suggest that the differences may extend beyond
mere spatial activation patterns, but may be rooted in the temporal dy-
namics of the two tasks and/or the processes that support response in-
hibition. We present time-resolved neural network activity profiles for
both the GNGT and the SST that represent different stages of cognitive
processing, spanning from perception to action and to higher cognitive
control functions. Our goal was to compare the changes in the networks
as a result of the defining experimental manipulation – the timing of the
inhibition signal relative to the go signal – while keeping all other task
parameters constant. Time-variant functional networks were extracted
by group independent component analysis (G-ICA; Eichele et al., 2011;
Huster et al., 2015; Huster and Raud, 2017) of the combined EEG activity
from both tasks, and the resulting independent component (IC)
time-courses were compared statistically by permutation testing.
Distributed source analysis was performed on the topographical maps of
the ICs to aid their interpretability as functional networks. In addition,
EMGwas recorded from the responding hands. As such, our approach is a
mixture of exploratory and confirmatory analyses. On the one hand, no
formal a priori restrictions were set on the G-ICA analysis although we
expected to recover at least one network for sensory, motor, and control
processes. On the other hand, statistical testing was performed on the
resulting networks with the aim to identify the core differences in the
underlying dynamics between the two tasks. We considered the possi-
bility of a shared inhibition mechanism, which would be reflected in
similar temporal dynamics of no-go and stop activity before or at the time
of the inhibition latency. In contrast, distinct mechanisms would result in
largely different IC time-courses when no-go and stop trials are con-
trasted directly. Given that all secondary parameters were identical be-
tween the tasks, processes other than inhibition may show comparable
time-courses. However, varying behavioral strategies between the tasks
may affect preparatory processes in expectation of the inhibition; thus,
changes in the processes supporting inhibition may be expected as well.
Therefore, combined differences in several IC time-courses would lead to
a conclusion of distinct mechanisms, defined as the distributed activity of
the networks recruited during response inhibition.
2. Methods
2.1. Sample
Data was collected from 37 participants (20 females, 17 males) be-
tween the age of 19 and 35 years (average age 26.8, standard deviation
5.37). The SST data is also used in Huster et al. (2019). All participants
were right-handed, reported no psychiatric or neurological disorders and
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Data from four participants
was discarded due to low performance on the stop signal task (go accu-
racies < 80%) and one participant was excluded as he did not complete
the full procedure. The final sample thus consists of 32 participants. The
participants came for two sessions within one week, one for EEG and one
for MRI. Prior to the experiments, all participants gave written informed
L. Raud et al. NeuroImage 210 (2020) 116582consent. Participants received monetary compensation for study partic-
ipation. The study was conducted in accordance with the ethical stan-
dards of the Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the internal
review board of the University of Oslo.
2.2. Tasks and procedure
All participants performed the GNGT and the SST in a single session,
with the order of tasks counterbalanced across participants. Each task
lasted for about 30 min. Task administration was controlled using E-
prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). Both tasks were
designed according to the current best practices, keeping the inhibition
probability low, trial pace fast, and using a choice reaction time task as
the primary task with individual SSD tracking in the SST (Verbruggen
et al., 2019; Wessel, 2018).
The go-stimuli were green arrows, pointing either to the left or to the
right (arrowhead 3  3.5 cm and base 3  1.5 cm). The no-go/stop
stimuli were blue arrows of the same size as the go stimuli. The partici-
pants sat at a viewing distance of approximately 80 cm from the screen.
All stimuli were presented in the center of the screen and a fixation cross
was presented at all other times during the experiment.
In the GNGT, participants were instructed to respond as quickly as
possible via a button press with the thumb of the hand corresponding to
the direction of the arrowhead. In some trials, a no-go stimulus appeared
instead of a go stimulus, signaling the participant not to respond. In the
SST, the primary task was the same as in the GNGT, namely to react to the
go stimuli with left or right button presses. In stop trials, the stop stimulus
appeared after the go stimulus after a short delay (stop-signal delay;
SSD), instructing the participant to suppress their initiated response.
In both tasks, all stimuli were presented for 100 ms, the inter-trial
interval was randomly set to a value between 1500 and 2500 ms, and
responses were collected throughout the experiment. In the SST, the SSD
was varied according to a performance tracking procedure that would
result in a stopping success of 50%. The initial SSD was set to 250 ms and
was increased or decreased in steps of 50 ms if stopping in the preceding
stop trial was successful or unsuccessful, respectively. The minimum
possible SSD was the go stimulus duration (100 ms) and the maximum
was set to 800 ms. The SSD tracking was done separately for stop left and
stop right trials.
Each task had 800 trials in total, with 600 go trials and 200 no-go or
stop trials (25% of all trials). There was an equal number of left and right
hand trials with 300 go left/right and 100 no-go or stop left/right trials.
The trials were equally distributed over 10 blocks (80 trials per block)
and participants received feedback after each block, instructing them to
be faster if the average go reaction time of the previous block exceeded
500 ms. In addition, instantaneous feedback ‘Too slow!’ was presented
after go omissions or if the RT of a given trial exceeded 800 ms. Pauses of
self-regulated duration were introduced after each block. A longer break
with a duration of 5–10 min was allowed in-between the two tasks. Prior
to both tasks, participants completed a short training session of 20 trials
to introduce them to the tasks. In the SST, it was additionally stressed that
it was not possible to be correct all the time and that it is important to be
both fast and accurate to prevent excessive waiting for the stop stimulus.
2.3. Data acquisition
EEG and EMG were recorded using a Neuroscan SynAmps2 (Com-
pumedics) amplifier. The data was digitized at 2500 Hz. EEG was
measured from 64 Ag/Ag–Cl electrodes, positioned according to the
extended 10–20 system with two horizontal EOG channels placed beside
the left and the right eye. All EEG electrodes were referenced online
against an electrode placed at the nose-tip and their impedances were
kept below 5 kOhm. Electrode AFz served as the ground electrode.
For EMG recordings, bipolar Ag/Ag–Cl electrodes were placed on the
skin surface above the abductor pollicis brevis, parallel to the belly of the
muscle. The ground electrode was placed on the left arm. Support was3
provided for the participants’ arms to reduce spurious baseline muscle
tension.
Structural MR images were acquired on a Philips Ingenia 3T scanner
with a 32-channel Philips SENSE head coil. The T1-weighted image was
obtained with a sequence of 184 sagittal slices of 1 mm thickness, and an
in-plane resolution of 256 256 at a FoV of 256 mm, which resulted in a
voxel size of 1  1  1 mm (TE 2.2 ms, TR 4.66 ms, flip angle 8).2.4. Data analysis
2.4.1. Behavior
The following behavioral measures were extracted: go trial accu-
racies, correct go trial reaction times (RT), no-go accuracies, stop accu-
racies, and in case of the SST, unsuccessful stop trial RTs and the SSRTs.
SSRTs for each participant were estimated separately for left and right
hand responses using the integration method. That is, the mean SSD was
subtracted from the go RT distribution percentile corresponding to the
probability of unsuccessful stopping (Band et al., 2003; Logan and
Cowan, 1984). According to an initial analysis (rmANOVA with factors
TASK (GNGT/SST) and HAND (left/right)), right hand responses showed
an advantage compared to the left hand responses in terms of higher go
accuracies and faster RTs (main effect of HAND on accuracies: F (1,31) ¼
33.90, p < 0.001, η2p ¼ 0.52; on RTs: F (1,31) ¼ 24.19, p < 0.001, η2p ¼
0.44). However, this effect was numerically small (mean difference and
standard deviation between left and right hand RTs 12 (18) and 11 (14)
ms in GNGT and SST, respectively; difference between accuracies 2 (3)
and 2 (3) % in GNGT and SST, respectively). There were no significant
HAND-TASK interaction effects, indicating that the right hand advantage
was not different between the tasks. Thus, all behavioral variables are
reported as an average over left and right hand trials to reduce re-
dundancies. Differences in go accuracies and RTs were compared be-
tween the tasks using paired t-tests.
2.4.2. EMG analysis
EMG channels were filtered between 10 and 200 Hz and resampled at
500 Hz. Data was first segmented relative to go or no-go stimulus onset
(2.5 s). Trials with amplifier saturation were discarded from the anal-
ysis (1.61% of all trials in the GNGT and 1.78% in the SST). A moving
average procedure was applied where, for each time point, the average
root mean square over 5 neighboring points was calculated. The
resulting waveforms were then divided by the trial-specific average of
pre-go (or no-go) activity from200 to 0 ms, and then z-scored across all
trials and time-points, separately for each hand. Data was then re-
segmented into conditions with a time-window of 200 to 1000 ms
relative to go-stimulus in go and no-go trials and 600 to 1000 ms
relative to stop-stimulus in stop trials. The trials were realigned by sub-
tracting the trial-specific pre-go baseline of 200 to 0 ms. An automatic
algorithm was used to detect EMG bursts, regardless of the trial type and
given response. An EMG response was identified when the z-scored and
baseline corrected activity exceeded the threshold of 1.2. This threshold
was chosen based on a visual inspection of the data, and random trials
were checked manually to confirm the algorithm’s performance. If an
EMG burst was detected in a given trial, two variables were extracted:
EMG onset latency (the first point over the threshold) and EMG peak
latency. Additionally, EMG burst frequency was defined as the percent-
age of trials with an EMG burst relative to the total number of trials in a
given condition. Trials where EMG onset started earlier than the go or no-
go stimulus and where prEMG peak was earlier than the stop stimulus
were discarded from further analysis.
For completeness, EMG frequencies were estimated for all trials (go,
no-go, stop) and both for selected (e.g. left hand in go/no-go/stop left
trials) and unselected hand (e.g. right hand in go/no-go/stop left trials,
Table 2). The EMG frequencies in selected hand go trials were estimated
to validate the performance of the automatic EMG algorithm. The prEMG
frequency in the unselected hand for all trials was estimated to
L. Raud et al. NeuroImage 210 (2020) 116582investigate the possibility of erroneous activations during the response
selection stage. EMG indices were averaged over left and right hand trials
(an initial analysis showed no differences between them).
Statistical analysis was performed on the selected hand prEMG in the
no-go/stop trials and in the unselected hand prEMG in the go trials, to
account for both, correctly inhibited prEMG responses in the no-go/stop
trials and erroneous prEMG in the go trials due to response competition.
This resulted in a full rmANOVA with factors TASK (GNGT, SST) and
TRIAL (go unselected hand, no-go/stop selected hand) for the detection
frequencies. An additional analysis was performed on the prEMG peak
latencies; however, the go unselected hand condition in the SST was
discarded due to the low number of trials that would yield unreliable
latency estimates. This resulted in a one-way ANOVAwith a hybrid factor
of TASK-TRIAL (GNGT-go-unselected, GNGT-no-go-selected, SST-stop-
selected). The ANOVAS were calculated with the package ez in the R
Project for Statistical Computing.
2.4.3. EEG preprocessing
EEGLAB (version 14.1.2) was used for data preprocessing (Delorme
and Makeig, 2004). EEG channels were filtered between 0.1 and 80 Hz,
resampled at 500 Hz and re-referenced to the common average of all EEG
channels. Data was first epoched from 2.5 to 3.5 s around all go stimuli
in the SST, and around all go and no-go stimuli in the GNGT. ICA was run
on the segmented data and components capturing eye or muscle artifacts,
as identified by visual inspection, were rejected. The remaining compo-
nents were back-projected to the channel domain. Data was then
re-segmented with a time-window of 0.2 to 1 s relative to go stimulus
onset in go trials and no-go/stop signal onset in the no-go/stop trials.
Baseline correction was applied by subtracting the mean pre-stimulus
activity from each trial. Trials with an absolute value exceeding the
threshold value of 75V were discarded as artifacts (0.5% GNGT, 1.1%
SST).
2.4.4. LRP analysis
In both tasks, prepotent motor activity is a prerequisite for response
inhibition. In the SST, prepotent motor activity is elicited by design, as
the stop signal always occurs after a go response has been initiated.
Recent evidence indicates that prepotent motor activity occurs in the
GNGT only if the task pace is fast and the probability of no-go trials is low
(Wessel, 2018). While these criteria were met in the task design, we
further confirmed the prepotent motor-activity by analysis of the later-
alized readiness potentials (LRP). The LRP was derived from low-pass
filtered EEG data (20 Hz), calculated for each condition by subtracting
the activity in the sensorimotor ipsilateral electrode from the contralat-
eral electrode (C3 and C4) and then averaging over left and right hand
trials. This was done for activity time-locked to the go (including go
stimulus in stop trials) or no-go stimulus, as well as time-locked to the
(pr)EMG onset (500 to 300 ms). In no-go/stop trials where no prEMG
was detected, average prEMG onset was used instead. The LRPs were
tested time-point-wise against zero using a t-test with a false discovery
rate (fdr) correction for multiple comparisons. To test the prepotent
motor activity between the tasks, we extracted the mean LRP amplitudes
from 100 to 0 prior to the (pr)EMG onset and compared these using
rmANOVA with factors TASK (GNGT, SST) and trial (go, no-go/stop).
Further, as the visualization of the LRPs indicated potential differences
during the actual responses, this analysis was repeated for the peak
amplitudes. We extracted the peak amplitudes by averaging the  5
datapoints around the minimum value in the time-window of 100 to
100 ms relative to the (pr)EMG onset.
2.4.5. G-ICA
G-ICA was performed using publicly available code for Matlab
(Huster and Raud, 2017). For the G-ICA, it is necessary to have an equal
number of trials for all participants in all conditions. Thus, a sub-selection
of trials was used for G-ICA, with 44 trials for each of the two tasks (the
lowest number of artefact-free trials available across all participants and4
conditions). Note that this sub-selection was only for the purpose of
calculating the G-ICA solution; once computed, the back-projection of the
ICs was done on each individual’s whole data set. The no-go and stop
trials were selected randomly; however, only the go trials with the re-
action times closest to the group average were selected for the G-ICA.
This is because G-ICA tends to perform poorly on the activity that is not
homogeneously time-locked to the stimulus onset, such as reaction times
(Huster et al., 2015). G-ICA estimates a common component structure
across subjects by first calculating subject-specific principal components
analyses (PCA), followed by group-level PCA and ICA. Ten components
were extracted from the subject-specific PCAs as these explained, on
average, 90% of each individual’s data. 90% represented a reasonable
trade-off between keeping as much data as possible, while having real-
istic computational demands for the further procedure. The
participant-specific components were stacked vertically, resulting in a
large principal components*participant X time*trials matrix, which was
then subjected to group level PCA and ICA. To determine the number of
group components, we used the ICASSO procedure (Himberg and
Hyvarinen, 2003) where we iteratively extracted a set of components
from 5 to 15, 100 times each. For each number of components, the sta-
bility over the 100 runs was checked by the means of agglomerative
clustering with average linkage. The number of components that resulted
in the most stable cluster solution (determined by the visualization of the
clusters and the estimate of the stability index Iq) was then selected for
the G-ICA as used for the final analyses. As a result of this procedure, 11
components were extracted.
Although G-ICA performs reasonably well in dissociating EEG com-
ponents with temporal overlap (Eichele et al., 2011; Huster et al., 2015),
there still remained the possibility that due to the fast sequential pre-
sentation of go and stop trials in the SST, the stop trial data may be
contaminated by systematic go-related EEG activity. Thus, to further
separate the go and stop processes, a regression analysis was performed
instead of the standard trial averaging to obtain condition-specific
component regression ERPs (rERP). First, individual IC time-courses
were computed from the continuous EEG data of each participant by
applying the participant-specific decomposition matrices obtained via
G-ICA. Then, automatic rejection of artifacts on the continuous data was
performed using the EEGLAB pop_rejcont function by rejecting data-points
where the power of higher frequencies (20–80 Hz) exceeded 15 dB
(~10% of all data, including breaks between the blocks). Finally, beta
weights for each condition were estimated by regression using the
EEGLAB plugin rERP (Smith and Kutas, 2015). The weights were esti-
mated separately for left and right hand trials, as hemispheric laterali-
zation effects may be captured by separate ICs. The beta weights were
estimated for each event of interest from 200 to 1000 ms. To prevent
overfitting due to an over-defined model, regularized regression with
L2-norm penalization was used. The regularization parameter lambda
was determined as the one yielding the highest R2 in a grid-search with
5-fold cross-validation.
2.4.6. IC statistical analysis
Each component’s condition-specific time-course from 200 to 600
ms was tested by permutation tests combined with threshold-free cluster
enhancement (tfce). Tfce takes the autocorrelation of the component data
into account and enhances the signal at each time-point depending on the
activity of the neighboring data-points (Smith and Nichols, 2009). A
statistical test is then performed on each data-point separately and a
correction for multiple comparisons is applied to the resulting p-values.
In contrast to the cluster-mass inference procedure, inference is done on
each data-point (as opposed to the whole cluster), which has the
advantage that the first or last time-point of the cluster of significant
activations is meaningful and can be interpreted as the onset or offset of
condition differences, respectively. The analysis was performed using the
PALM software (Winkler et al., 2014). In the general linear model, we
tested the effect of the factors TRIAL (go vs stop/no-go), SIDE (left vs
right) and the interaction of TRIAL x SIDE separately for the GNGT and
Table 1
Summary statistics (means and standard deviations) of the behavioral measures.
GNGT SST
Go accuracy (%) 95.07 (3.12) 94.25 (4.38)
Go RT (ms) 405 (33) 608 (90)
No-go/stop accuracy (%) 99.08 (1.23) 52.31 (2.43)
Unsuccessful stop RT (ms) – 534 (86)
SSD (ms) – 403 (107)
SSRT (ms) – 194 (30)
L. Raud et al. NeuroImage 210 (2020) 116582SST. The parameters for tfce were H ¼ 2, E ¼ 1, and the rERP
time-courses were permuted 10,000 times within participants. The
resulting two-tailed p-values were corrected for multiple comparisons
using a fdr correction at an alpha value of 0.05. We only report clusters
with significant effects that span more than 20 ms. Next, a conjunction
analysis for the GNGT and SST was performed in order to identify
time-intervals where no-go activity was different from go activity in the
GNGT and stop activity was different from go activity in the SST. That is,
the t- and p-values from the go vs. no-go and go vs. stop comparison were
combined by taking the minimum absolute t-value and corresponding
p-value per time point (Nichols et al., 2005). Note that the absolute
t-value is blind to the direction of the effect and may falsely identify a
conjunction where the main effects for two tasks were in the opposing
directions. For this reason, the conjunction analysis was performed twice
for each main effect, once for positive and once for negative t-values. The
resulting p-values were fdr-corrected at an alpha-level of 0.025, which
corresponds to two-tailed alpha value of 0.05. Lastly, another model with
factors TRIAL (no-go/stop) and SIDE (left/right) was fit to directly test
the differences between the IC time-courses of the two types of inhibi-
tion. The procedure and parameters for tfce, permutations, and multiple
comparison correction were the same as before.
The results from the permutation analysis suggested pre-stimulus
differences between go and stop trials in multiple ICs. To further inves-
tigate the dynamics of these ICs, two additional analyses were performed
on a post-hoc basis. For the first one, a median split was computed for
each participant’s go RTs and ‘slow’ and ‘fast’ time-courses were
extracted separately by the rERP procedure. These were then subjected to
a similar permutation testing as described above, with the factors RT
(slow vs fast) and SIDE (left vs right). Similarly, unsuccessful stop trial
beta weights were extracted by the rERP procedure and subjected to
statistical testing with factors STOP (successful vs unsuccessful) and SIDE
(left vs right).
2.4.7. IC source localization
Each participant’s cortical surface was extracted automatically from
the T1 MRI image using the Freesurfer analysis suite (http://surfer.nmr
.mgh.harvard.edu/), and the individual anatomies were imported to
Brainstorm for source analysis (Tadel et al., 2011; http://neuroimage
.usc.edu/brainstorm). The standard EEG electrode locations were
co-registered with each participant’s head surface and boundary element
headmodels were constructed with OpenMEEG (three layers with 1922
vertices each; relative conductivities: scalp ¼ 1, skull ¼ 0.0125, brain ¼
1; Gramfort et al., 2010; Kybic et al., 2005). Source estimation was done
for 15,002 dipoles distributed along the cortical surface using the indi-
vidual IC time-courses that were back-projected to the channel domain
and averaged across trials. Since each IC is characterized by a unique
topography that is constant over time and conditions, we selected the
condition and the time-window for each subject at which the IC’s
signal-to-noise-ratio was the highest. This was calculated by dividing the
IC time-course into bins of 50 ms and dividing the mean absolute value of
a given bin by the standard deviation of the baseline period. The sources
were estimated for the resulting condition using sLORETA with uncon-
strained source orientations. Diagonal noise-covariance matrix was used
with the regularization parameter set to 0.1. The resulting 3-dimensional
dipole values were projected to a single value using singular value
decomposition and averaged over time-points in the selected time-bin.
The source maps of each participant were then projected to a standard
anatomical template (ICBM152) and down-sampled to the Destrieux
atlas for anatomical labeling and interpretation. As distributed source
modelling algorithms tend to falsely identify strong responses at the
edges of the forward model, such activity patterns were considered un-
reliable and discarded from further analysis. For the remaining regions,
t-tests for deviations from zero were performed to assess the significance
of the source constellation of each IC at the group level. The resulting
p-values were fdr-corrected for multiple comparisons with an alpha level
of 0.05.5
2.4.8. Cross-correlation analysis
The point-wise testing of IC time-courses may result in significant
differences even though the general shape of the time-courses is the same
but shifted in time. Given that the prEMG analysis suggested temporal
differences between the GNGT and the SST, we performed additional
analyses on a post-hoc basis to rule this possibility out. To this means, the
post-stop and the post-no-go time courses (both extracted from 0 to 800
ms) of each IC were cross-correlated considering lags up to 800 ms. This
analysis provided correlation coefficients as a function of lag for each
participant. Given the difference in prEMG peak latencies between the
no-go and stop trials of 176 ms, similarly shaped but lagged IC time-
courses would result in a peak of positive correlation coefficients
around 176 ms (i.e. the stop trial time-course temporally leading
relative to the no-go time course). To test this, we extracted the time-lag
of maximum correlation from each participant and tested whether this
was smaller than zero by one-tailed t-tests for each component, fdr-
corrected for multiple comparisons over components and hands (left
and right hand trials). To visualize the averaged correlations as a function
of time-lag, participant-specific coefficients were Fisher z-transformed,




Behavioral results are listed in Table 1. Overall, participants showed
good task performance as indicated by go accuracies >94% in both tasks
and an average no-go accuracy of 99%. Stop accuracies were close to 50%
and reaction times in unsuccessful stop trials were faster than go reaction
times for each participant and at the group level (t (31) ¼ 21.48, p <
0.001, d ¼ 3.80). This is in good compliance with the horse race model
assumption stating that the reaction times in the unsuccessful stop trials
should correspond to the left side of the go RT distribution. The average
SSRT was 194 ms. While go accuracies showed no significant difference
between the tasks (t (31) ¼ 0.90, p ¼ 0.375, d ¼ 0.159), RTs were
considerably slower in the SST than in the GNGT (t (31) ¼ 13.89, p <
0.001, d ¼ 2.46).
3.2. EMG
3.2.1. Overt response EMG
All extracted EMG measures are listed in Table 2 and EMG time-
courses are depicted in Fig. 1. The visualization of the time-courses of
the selected hand go trials corroborate the behavioral findings of later
responses in the SST than in the GNGT. Go reaction times in the SST also
appear to have larger variability that contributes to the reduced ampli-
tudes of the averaged EMG wave-form. The automatic EMG detection
algorithm performed well, as indicated by the detection of EMG bursts in
around 97% of correct go trials. The below 100% detection rate implies a
slightly conservative performance of the algorithm; misses were due to
random noise or elevated muscle activity in the pre-go baseline period.
Baseline root mean square values were similar for the GNGT and SST
(mean baseline root mean square across all trials were 9.84 and 9.66 for
the GNGT and SST, respectively).
Table 2
Mean values and the standard deviations of the EMG measures. “Avg nr of trials”
represents the average number of trials where EMG was detected, summed over
left and right hand trials. “Frequency” represents the number of trials with EMG
as a percentage of all correct trials. Onset latencies are calculated relative to the
go or no/go stimulus. Peak latencies are calculated relative to the event of in-
terest, i.e. relative to go stimulus in go trials, no-go stimulus in no-go trials, and
stop stimulus in stop trials. N.e. - not estimated due to low frequency of trials.
Values in bold are trials where an overt response was given; the other values
represent prEMG activity without an overt response.
GNGT SST
Go No-go Go Stop
Selected hand
Avg nr of trials 542 (37) 27 (20) 528 (42) 40 (14)
Frequency (%) 97.55 (3.38) 14.18 (10.43) 96.55 (3.89) 44.69 (18.75)
Onset (ms) 282 (36) 285 (78) 452 (92) 456 (86)
Peak (ms) 350 (40) 316 (88) 545 (91) 140 (30)
Unselected hand
Avg nr of trials 114 (67) 13 (14) 42 (47) 4 (5)
Frequency (%) 20.75 (12.62) 6.65 (7.55) 7.75 (9.16) 4.91 (7.71)
Onset (ms) 258 (47) n.e. n.e. n.e.
Peak (ms) 289 (56) n.e. n.e. n.e.
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The primary measures of interest were the prEMG bursts, that is, EMG
bursts in trials without registered button presses. Such prEMG activity
was clearly visible in the averaged EMG time-courses and they were
especially pronounced in the SST when the time-courses were locked to
the stop signal onset (Fig. 1). PrEMGwas more frequent in successful stop
trials (45%) than in successful no-go trials (14%). Interestingly, prEMG
responses were detected also in the unselected hands in go trials (21% in
GNGT, 7% in SST), reflecting response competition in go trials. The
ANOVA on the prEMG frequencies found a main effect of the TASK (F
(1,31)¼ 17.53, p< 0.001, η2p ¼ 0.36) and TRIAL (F (1, 31)¼ 131.11, p<
0.001, η2p ¼ 0.81), as well as an interaction of the two (F (1,31) ¼ 191, p
< 0.001, η2p ¼ 0.86). Post-hoc tests confirmed that unselected hand
prEMG in go trials was more frequent in the GNGT than the SST, while
selected hand prEMG occurred more often in the stop than in the no-go
trials (all p’s < 0.005).
PrEMG peak latencies were also different between the trials. For this
analysis, the unselected hand go trials in the SST were excluded due to
the low detection rates (<10%) that would yield unrepresentative la-
tency estimates, resulting in a one-way ANOVA with a hybrid TASK-
TRIAL factor (GNGT-go unselected, GNGT-no-go selected, SST-stop
selected). This analysis revealed a main effect of this 3-level factor on
prEMG peak latencies (F (2,62) ¼ 117.61, p < 0.001, ¼ 0.79). Post-hocFig. 1. Averaged EMG time-courses of all successful trials (including trials withou
represent the time-locking event and the vertical dashed lines represent the average
both, time-locking event and the amount of prEMG trials of all successful trials (see
6
comparisons confirmed that the prEMG responses peaked at the
earliest in stop trials (139 ms relative to stop), then in GNGT go trials
(unselected hand; 289m–s relative to go) and then in no-go trials (316ms
relative to no-go; all p’s < 0.006).
In sum, partial responses of the inhibited hand were detected both in
the no-go and stop trials. This EMG activity peaked earlier in the SST than
in the GNGT, perhaps indicating fast response inhibition in the SST.
Furthermore, the unselected hand prEMG responses indicate stronger
response competition in go trials of the GNGT than the SST.
3.3. EEG
3.3.1. Event-related potentials
Both, no-go and stop trials elicited the typical N2/P3 complex that
was strongest at central midline electrodes in the standard ERPs
(Fig. 2A). Notably, go trials in the GNGT also elicited a prominent P3
peak, although its topography was more parietally focused compared to
the no-go P3.
All trials showed significant LRPs (Fig. 2B), both when time-locked to
the go or no-go stimulus, and to the (pr)EMG onset. The exact time-points
when the LRP was significantly different from zero are listed in Table 3.
The prepotent motor activity (quantified by the average LRP amplitude
up to 100 ms prior to the (pr)EMG onset) was greater in go trials, but
relatively similar between no-go and stop trials (mean amplitude and sd
in μV: GNGT go ¼ 0.90 (0.64), GNGT no-go ¼ 0.43 (0.35), SST go ¼
0.88 (0.66), SST stop ¼ 0.38 (0.73). The rmANOVA confirmed that
the LRPs were larger (i.e. more negative) in the go than in no-go/stop
trials (main effect of TRIAL: F (1,32) ¼ 42.46, p < 0.001, η2p ¼ 0.58),
but there was no significant main effect of the TASK (F (1,31)¼ 0.07, p¼
0.798, η2p < 0.01) nor interaction effect (F (1,3) ¼ 0.04, p ¼ 0.848, η2p <
0.01). However, the figure indicates that there may be differences in the
general motor dynamics between the tasks during the response, indicated
by the differences in the go trial LRPs around the EMG onset. Thus, we
repeated the analysis by extracting the peak amplitudes time-locked to
the EMG. We wound a main effect of the TRIAL (F (1,32) ¼ 33.79, p <
0.001, η2p ¼ 0.50), a main effect of the TASK (F (1,32)¼ 33.79, p< 0.001,
η2p ¼ 0.52), as well as an interaction of the two (F (1,31) ¼ 9.36, p ¼
0.005, η2p ¼ 0.23). The posthoc tests indicated the LRP amplitude was
larger in the GNGT than in the SST in the go trials (mean and sd in μV:
GNGT go ¼ 3.09 (1.40); SST go ¼ 1.88 (1.06); p < 0.001) but there
were no differences between the no-go and stop trials (GNGT no-go ¼
1.90 (0.80); SST no-go¼1.44 (0.88); p¼ 0.26). In sum there appears
to be differences in the motor dynamics between the two tasks, perhaps
indicating lower response thresholds in the SST, yet the absolute levels of
the pre-motor activity showed no differences between the tasks.t prEMG). The shaded areas represent standard errors. The vertical solid lines
SSD relative to the time-locking event. Note that the amplitudes are affected by
Table 2 for details).
Fig. 2. A. Event-related potentials (ERPs) at electrode Cz. The topographies
represent the voltage distribution at all electrodes at the peak latencies of the N2
and P3 (as indicated by the arrows). B. LRP activity time-locked to the stimulus
onset (go/no-go stimulus in the GNGT and go/stop stimulus in the SST; left
panel), and to the EMG onset (right panel). The green bars above and below
reflect the periods in which LRPs were significantly different from zero.
Table 3
Time-windows in which the LRP activity was significantly different from zero.
Stimulus-locked (pr)EMG-locked
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Eleven independent components (ICs) were extracted via G-ICA. The
relevant IC time-courses, topographies, and source constellations are
depicted in Fig. 3. Based on the time-courses, topographies, and sources,
the resulting ICs can be interpreted as sensory (IC1), motor control (IC2
and IC3), and attentional or cognitive control components (IC4-IC7). The
remaining four components were relatively small in amplitude, had
rather unspecific topographies, and showed no or only minor differences
between tasks and/or conditions. Thus, although these ICs showed some
stability across the different runs of ICASSO, they appeared to have only7
minor contributions to the general task processing. Alternatively, they
may represent mixed processes due to very different contributions to the
group IC from individual participants, hampering their interpretability as
functional networks. Given the low contribution of these ICs and their
ambiguous interpretation, these four components will not be discussed
further.
In the following, we first describe each IC’s topography, source
constellation, and a global time course to derive a putative interpretation
in terms of its functional neuroanatomy. Then, we describe the condi-
tional effects in the GNGT and SST, as well as the conjunction of these
effects across both tasks. Lastly, we describe the differences of the IC
time-courses directly contrasting the no-go and stop trials. Since the signs
of the IC time-courses are somewhat arbitrary (the true deflection on the
scalp corresponds to the multiplication of the IC time-course and the
topography), we refrain from describing the peaks of the time-courses as
positive or negative.
IC1: Early sensory component. IC1’s time-course and topography were
reminiscent of the typical early sensory ERP complex (P1 and N1) with
strongest activation in the occipital and parietal electrodes. The source
localization results indicated sources in frontal (bilateral frontal-superior
gyrus, bilateral anterior cingulate, bilateral insula, left middle- and
inferior-frontal cortex) and parieto-occipital areas (bilateral posterior
cingulate, precuneus, occipital cortex and right superior parietal cortex).
IC2 and IC3: Motor control components. IC2’s topography spanned
diagonally over right frontal and central parietal electrodes. IC3 showed
a very similar, almost symmetrical topography over the left hemisphere.
The time-courses of IC2 and IC3 were also similar, but opposite in
handedness, with IC2 having the strongest activity in right hand go trials
and IC3 in left hand go trials, the differences being most prominent in the
GNGT. This suggests that IC2 and IC3 play a role in motor control.
However, the source constellation suggests a wider sensorimotor-frontal
network with significant clusters for IC2 in bilateral anterior cingulate,
right middle-frontal cortex, left motor and somatosensory cortex, bilat-
eral middle-occipital cortex and cuneus. IC3 was localized to left fronto-
lateral and parietal cortices, bilateral insula, as well as bilateral middle-
parietal, cuneus and middle-occipital regions. In sum, these two com-
ponents appear to form lateralized networks with activations in the right
frontal and parieto-occipital areas (as well as left motor and somato-
sensory areas) for IC2, and left frontal and parieto-occipital areas in case
of IC3.
IC4, IC5, IC6 and IC7: Attentional and cognitive control components. IC4
had a parietal topography and sources in the bilateral somatosensory
cortex, bilateral superior-parietal cortex and right lateral prefrontal
cortex, likely corresponding to the fronto-parietal attentional network.
IC5 appeared to capture the N2/P3 complex. The source localization
identified a widespread cluster that covered most of the cortical areas,
with strongest activations in the middle and posterior cingulate. Lastly,
there were two components, IC6 and IC7, which exhibited right frontal
topographies. IC7 was located to the parietal and occipital areas despite
its frontal topography. IC6, however, showed two distinct clusters in the
right ventro-lateral frontal cortex and right inferior-parietal cortex and
might therefore correspond to the right-lateralized stopping network.
3.3.3. Task-specific IC dynamics
GNGT. The time-periods of significant differences in the IC time-
courses between go and no-go trials are listed in Table 4 and their tem-
poral order is depicted in Fig. 4 (upper left panel). The earliest differences
occurred at around 70 ms after stimulus presentation in IC1, indicating
that the go and no-go stimuli were processed differently already at the
early sensory stage. Early differences, starting at around 80 ms, were also
observed in the attentional control processes captured by IC4 and IC5.
Note that although IC5 seemed to capture the N2/P3 component in the
standard ERP, the earliest differences between go and no-go trials seem
to reflect smaller yet relevant amplitude fluctuations before the actual
development of the N2/P3 wave. Next, significant differences between
go and no-go trials occurred in the motor control components (IC2 and
Fig. 3. The rERP time-courses, topographies (averaged IC weight matrices) and source constellations of the group-ICs. The bars above the GNGT and below the SST
time-courses represent the permutation testing results for the model TRIAL þ SIDE þ TRIAL*SIDE where the colors indicate significant time-intervals for each effect.
The two bars in between the time-course plots of each component represent the main effect of TRIAL in the conjunction (go vs no-go AND go vs stop) and the contrast
(no-go vs stop) analysis. Green represents intervals where go > no-go/stop and blue represents intervals where no-go/stop > go. In the contrast analysis, black
represents intervals where no-go > stop, and gray represents intervals where stop > no-go. The source localization results are masked so that only significant regions
are marked in red.
L. Raud et al. NeuroImage 210 (2020) 116582IC3) starting from around 130 ms onwards. These were the only com-
ponents showing hand-specific activity (captured by the factor SIDE), as
well as SIDE-by-TRIAL interactions, with the strongest activity in go right
and go left trials for IC2 and IC3, respectively. Lastly, there was a short
but significant difference between go and no-go trials in the right-
lateralized IC6, starting at around 170 ms. No significant differences
occurred in the time-course of IC7. In sum, the component activity be-
tween go and no-go trials before the no-go prEMG peak latency at 316 ms
revealed significant differences first in terms of sensory processing (IC1),
then in attentional control networks (IC4 and IC5), then in motor control
networks (IC2 and IC3), and finally in the right-lateralized control
network (IC6).
SST. Time-periods of significant differences between go and stop
trials in the SST are listed in Table 4 and in Fig. 4 (upper right panel).8
Differences between go and stop trials occurred already during the pre-
stimulus baseline period in the right-lateralized control network IC6, as
well as in the early sensory IC1. Very early differences, occurring almost
immediately after stimulus presentation, were also observed in the motor
control networks IC2 and IC3. These were followed by significant dif-
ferences in the fronto-parietal IC4 at 96 ms. These were the only differ-
ences observed before the prEMG peak latency at around 140 ms. Later
differences occurred in IC5 that captured the N2/P3 complex, and IC7
from 167 and 170 ms onwards, respectively. In sum, response cancella-
tion in the SST was characterized by pre-stimulus activity in the right-
lateralized control and sensory networks, followed by rapid changes in
the wider motor control system.
It may be argued that the early differences seen in IC6, IC1, IC2 and
IC3 may merely be driven by the processing of the preceding go stimulus
Table 4
The results of permutation testing and source localization. For each IC, the region with the maximum t-value, it’s corresponding anatomical label (corresponding to the
Destrieux atlas) and Broadmann area (BA) are reported. The permutation testing results indicate the time-periods (ms) of statistical differences of the model TRIAL (go vs
no-go/stop) þ SIDE (left vs right) þ TRIAL*SIDE. The conjunction refers to significant differences between go vs no-go AND go vs stop, and the contrast refers to the
significant differences between no-go and stop trials. As no effects for the SIDE or TRIAL*SIDE occurred in the SST, conjunction and contrast model, these columns are
omitted from the table. Alphafdr ¼ 0.05
IC max t label BA GNGT GNGT GNGT SST CONJUNCTION CONTRAST
trial side trial x side trial trial trial
1 4.978 Left lateral anterior fissure 45 72–114
128–160
166–248























4 7.156 Left postcentral sulcus 1, 5 82–132
174–232
250–422
– – 96–600 250–416 80–472
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contamination during data collection and preprocessing: first, the jit-
tering of the SSD typically attenuates go-related activity as the stop-
locked EEG is not time-locked to the go stimulus or RTs; second, go
and stop processes are assumed to be independent and would therefore
be separable through G-ICA; third, we further separated the overlapping
go and stop processes by means of regression. Notably, these manipula-
tions are likely to hold even if there are dependencies between go and
stop processes – due to the SSD jittering, the exact timing of such in-
teractions varies, introducing temporally jittered non-linear signal sum-
mation which is likely regarded as noise both by the G-ICA and regression
modelling (Huster et al., 2015; Smith and Kutas, 2015). However, the
comparisons between go and stop trials suffer from the fact that, ac-
cording to the horse race model, only slow go responses get inhibited, as
fast go responses escape the inhibition process. The observed effects in
the pre-stimulus baseline could therefore reflect differences in motor
preparation and/or proactive inhibition between fast and slow go re-
sponses. We therefore conducted two follow-up analyses: we first con-
trasted fast and slow go responses, and then successful and unsuccessful
stop trials. The results are listed in Table 5 and are visualized in Fig. 5.
For the sensory IC1, differences occurred between fast and slow go re-
sponses at 138–190 ms and then again after 370 ms. These differences
were reflected also in the contrast of successful and unsuccessful stop
trials, starting as early as 8 ms after stop stimulus presentation and
continuing throughout the trial. Similarly, the motor control components
IC2 and IC3 showed differences between slow and fast responses prior to
response execution (here, hand-specificity occurred in the SST as well).
Early differences in these ICs occurred also between successful and un-
successful stop trials. For the right-lateralized IC6, differences occurred
between slow and fast go trials prior to response execution, but no such
differences were observed between successful and unsuccessful stop tri-
als. In sum, our analyses suggest that the pre-stimulus differences be-
tween go and stop trials may be driven by changes between fast and slow
go trials, that in turn play a role in whether the ongoing response can be
inhibited or not. Altogether, this suggests that at least part of the SST
performance and neurophysiological changes appear to reflect earlier
modulation of sensory and motor processes by the task context, inde-
pendent of stop stimulus processing.9
3.3.4. Overlapping IC dynamics (go vs. no-go and go vs. stop)
The results of the conjunction analysis are listed in Table 4 and Fig. 4
(lower left panel). Here, significance indicates those time-periods when
no-go vs. go activity was of similar difference as the stop vs. go activity.
The earliest conjunction occurred in sensory IC1 at 128 ms, followed by
the motor control components IC2 and IC3 at 136 and 142 ms, respec-
tively. This clearly showed that, apart from the similarities in the sensory
processing between the two tasks, the earliest similarities occurred at or
after the time-point when inhibition processes had already reached the
peripheral level in the SST, as shown by the prEMG peak latency. Further
conjunction periods occurred in IC5 (N2/P3) starting from 166 ms and in
IC4 (fronto-parietal attention) from 250 ms onwards. These are well in
line with previous research identifying the N2/P3 complex in both tasks,
but their temporal conjunction that appeared later in task processing
further supports that they reflect other processes than inhibition, e.g.
conflict monitoring, attentional capture or feedback processes. There was
no conjunction in the right-lateralized cognitive control component IC6
nor in the IC7.
3.3.5. Contrasting IC dynamics (no-go vs. stop)
There were more differences in the time-courses of no-go and stop
trials than there were similarities between the two tasks (Table 4, Fig. 4
lower right panel). Converging with the results of the SST analysis, early
differences between no-go and stop trials occurred in the right-lateralized
control component IC6, then sensory-attentional IC1, and the motor
control components IC2 and IC3. Early differences, at around 100–200
ms, were also observed in the attention and cognitive control compo-
nents IC4, IC5 and IC7. Thus, early differences that continued throughout
the trial time-course occurred in all identified components.
3.3.6. Cross-correlation of IC time-courses
The cross-correlation analysis for each IC was performed using no-go
and stop trial time-courses to rule out that the observed differences result
from temporally lagged but otherwise similar network activities. A pos-
itive correlation peaking at around 176 ms would thus reflect the
observed delays in prEMG peak latencies of no-go relative to stop trials.
Fig. 6 shows the correlation coefficients as a function of time-lag for each
IC. The correlation function peaks around zero in all components, and the
Fig. 4. The timing of significant effects in the GNGT (upper left), SST (upper right), the conjunction (lower left), and contrast analysis (lower right). The gray areas
mark the significant time intervals for a given effect. ICs are ordered top-to-bottom according to when the significant statistical effect on that IC first occurred. The blue
vertical lines represent the prEMG peak latencies or SSRT, as specified on the figure.
Table 5
The results of the permutation tests comparing slow and fast go responses as well
as successful and failed stop trials. The permutation tests indicate the time-
periods (ms) of statistical differences of the model RT (slow vs fast) þ SIDE
(left vsright) þ RT*SIDE and STOP (successful vs failed) þ SIDE (left vs right) þ
STOP*SIDE. As no interaction effects were significant in either model, these
columns are omitted from the table. Alphafdr ¼ 0.05.
IC Slow vs fast go Successful vs unsuccessful stop
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from zero in any of the components (all p’s approached 1 after fdr
correction). Thus, we concluded that none of the ICs showed merely
temporally lagged profiles that could explain the differences between no-
go and stop time-courses.104. Discussion
Our primary goal was to delineate and compare the cascade of
cognitive processes in the GNGT and the SST. We hypothesized that the
GNGT and SST may share similar task processing, including similar
inhibitory mechanisms. Alternatively, GNGT and SST may operate
through different mechanisms. We found evidence against the first and in
support of the second alternative, suggesting that response inhibition in
the most commonly used tasks, the GNGT and SST, rely on different
neural mechanisms. This conclusion is based on: 1) behavioral results
where go responses were greatly delayed in the SST compared to the
GNGT; 2) prEMG activity that declined considerably faster in the SST
than in the GNGT; 3) EEG results where the temporal dynamics of ICs
differed greatly between the two tasks and showed only very little
overlap in the conjunction analysis. The cascade of EEG changes between
the go and no-go trials in the GNGT followed an expected and intuitive
order, starting from the sensory component, followed by the attentional
allocation and/or cognitive control components and only then the motor
control components. In the SST, the brain activity was different, sug-
gesting an important role of the cognitive control already at the pre-
stimulus period that might bias the sensory and motor processes prior
to the stop stimulus presentation. This might trigger very fast changes in
sensorimotor and frontal integration upon the presentation of the stop
stimulus.
The first differences between the go and no-go trials in the GNGT
Fig. 5. IC time-courses in the SST, comparing slow and fast go trials (left
panels), as well as successful and unsuccessful stops (right panel). The bars
above the time-courses indicate significant time-intervals for each effect. Green
indicates the time-intervals where fast > slow go or successful > unsuccessful
stop. Blue indicates time-intervals where slow > fast go or unsuccessful >
successful stop.
Fig. 6. Cross-correlations between stop and no-go IC time-courses as a function
of time-lag. The solid vertical line represent time-lag of zero, indicating no lag
between time-courses. The dashed vertical line represents the prEMG-informed
expected time-lag of 176 ms.
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motor control processes. Notably, sensory IC1 was initially stronger in go
than in no-go trials, and vice versa in the later time-points. Similarly,
there was a strong positive P3-like deflection in go trials both in the ICs
(IC4 and 5) and in standard ERPs. EMG results indicate that the elec-
trophysiological effects may be due to a high degree of response
competition during action selection in go trials. PrEMG responses were
detected more often in the unselected hand in go trials than in the no-go
trials, and these declined earlier (289 vs 316 ms for go and no-go trials,
respectively). It is possible then that no-go trials recruit mechanisms akin
to response selection. In fact, there may be no additional need for an
active inhibition mechanism in no-go trials, as all pre-potent but irrele-
vant responses may be resolved at the response selection stage, similarly
to the response competition as seen in the go trials. The late and rather
infrequent prEMG observed in the no-go trials may, in this case, reflect11trials that escaped the earlier response selection stage. Such an inter-
pretation is in line with the action restraint model, which states that
correct no-go performance actually corresponds to the decision not to
respond (Bari et al., 2009; Schachar et al., 2007). However, the addi-
tional changes in the attentional, cognitive and motor control compo-
nents, as well as the delayed prEMG peak in the no-go trials may suggest
additional processing stages after the initial response selection. Whether
these reflect sequential response selection and inhibition processes, or
simply confounding cognitive processes elicited by the novelty or sur-
prise, is an important issue for future research.
The SST exhibited differences between the go and stop trials already
at the pre-stop level in the right-lateralized control component IC6 and
the sensory IC1. Similarly, changes in the motor control components IC2
and IC3 appeared very early after the stop signal (14 and 2 ms, respec-
tively, making it unlikely that these were driven by stop stimulus
detection). This early activity appeared to differentiate also between slow
and fast go trials, as well as between successful and unsuccessful stop
trials (apart from IC6). It is therefore likely that activity in the sensory
and motor networks is modulated by proactive control in expectation for
a stop signal and that the readiness of these systems may influence the
performance upon the stop stimulus detection. The subsequent differ-
ences in IC4 may reflect the allocation of attention necessary for stimulus
discrimination, or possibly the rapid integration of frontal control sys-
tems related to the maintenance of stimulus-response associations with
sensorimotor processing. Remarkably, the actual stopping triggered by
the stop-stimulus presentation appears to be very fast, at around 140 ms.
This is in line with findings of peripheral EMG decline at around 150 ms
in different versions of SST (Atsma et al., 2018; Raud and Huster, 2017),
as well as with studies showing the reduction of corticomotor excitability
around this time. Considering the corticospinal conduction time of
around 20 ms, inhibition should occur at the cortical level at or before
120 ms (Jana et al., 2019). Interestingly, while transmission between the
sensory and frontal cortices may be as fast as 80–100 ms (Foxe and
Simpson, 2002), such fast projections are feedforward and possibly
without conscious access, but enable the rapid extraction of meaningful
features from the visual scene (Lamme, 2006). This fast sequence of
events motivates the proposal that response inhibition must incorporate
some degree of automaticity, as there may simply not be enough time for
the deliberate engagement of control functions.
Converging evidence indicates that response inhibition may arise from
the interaction of effortful proactive and reflexive reactive mechanisms.
The automaticity of inhibition has been proposed earlier such that previ-
ously learned stimulus-response associations automatically activate stop
goals (Verbruggen et al., 2014a). Crucially, such automatic inhibition
L. Raud et al. NeuroImage 210 (2020) 116582appears only if stopping is a possibility in the general task context (Chiu
and Aron, 2014). In the context of action control, stopping may thus be
akin to a prepared or intention-based reflex, where sensory and motor pro-
cesses are biased towards fast and efficient stop signal processing (Elchlepp
et al., 2016; Verbruggen et al., 2014b). Our results support this proposal,
showing early processing in the control and sensory networks that is
associated with slower RTs, followed by rapid changes in motor and
frontal control regions upon the detection of the stop signal.
Our results suggest a distinction between action cancellation through
response selection and automatic response inhibition, here associated
with performance in the GNGT and SST, respectively. However, prior
work shows that go RTs are slowed down after the presentation of a
subliminal inhibition signal both in the GNGT and SST (van Gaal et al.,
2010, 2009, 2008), suggesting that both tasks may incorporate automatic
inhibition to some degree. Further, automatic inhibition in the GNGT
occurred only in the beginning of the experiment, suggesting that prac-
tice effects led to the elimination for the need of inhibition, while the
decision to respond became mediated by automatic facilitation of the
selected response (Chiu et al., 2012). It is likely that, by increasing the
motor prepotency (e.g., by using a simple RT task as the primary task or
decreasing the inter-trial interval), a higher demand for the automatic
inhibition mechanism in the GNGT would be achieved. Similarly, elim-
inating the need to respond fast in the SST (e.g. by changing task in-
structions or by reducing feedback) may lead to strategic slowing, as
response selection mechanism may be better suited for action control
with no demands for fast responding. Thus, these two mechanisms may
work independently of each other and the degree to which they are
activated may be affected by the detailed set of experimental procedures,
but likely also by internal factors such as individual differences in
behavioral strategies.
Impaired response inhibition is considered one of the core deficits in
several psychiatric disorders, particularly in attention-deficit hyperac-
tivity disorder (ADHD) and obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD; Lipszyc
and Schachar, 2010). In addition, inhibition tasks belong to the standard
test batteries for testing the neurocognitive impairments after acquired
brain damage, where these tests contribute to the diagnosis of the rather
undifferentiated dysexecutive syndrome (Stuss and Alexander, 2007).
Our results add to the converging evidence that the practice of using such
tasks interchangeably to measure a deficit in inhibitory control is un-
warranted. For example, Kr€amer et al. (2013) found that patients with
lateral prefrontal cortex lesions had more no-go omissions than healthy
control participants in the GNGT, but were relatively comparable in their
SST performance. In contrast, Sebastian et al. (2012) found that patients
with ADHD had comparable levels of no-go commission errors, but had
slower SSRTs and larger go RT variability than the control group. This
dissociation highlights the discrepancies in the underlying mechanisms
that may contribute to distinct symptom profiles. Based on our results, it
may be further speculated that deficits in the GNGT task arise from
impaired decision making processes, while deficits in the SST arise from
impaired proactive and attentional control and/or the integration of
frontal control systems with sensoryimotor processes. The proposed
mechanism underlying the SST would predict that the patient pop-
ulations show deficits not only in inhibition indices (e.g. SSRT), but they
should also show deficits in processes related to the go response.
Our approach for the decomposition of EEG via G-ICA was completely
data-driven, yet, the recovered IC activations and source constellations
converged on the regions similar to those of earlier studies of response
inhibition. Nonetheless, one has to be aware that while larger compo-
nents (e.g. P3) tend to be recovered similarly between different studies,
the exact decomposition is dependent on the specific task constellation.
Further, while there is strong evidence for the interactions between the
go and stop processes in the SST (Boucher et al., 2007; Schall et al.,
2017), the combination of G-ICA and regression modelling are limited in
dissociating the non-linear and temporally jittered signal summation.
This may be alleviated in future research by the attempts to dissociate the
go and stop processes separately at each SSD, yet this requires a12specialized design to ensure enough trials and sufficient signal-to-noise
ratio at each SSD. In addition, while the changes between no-go and
stop processing were beyond mere temporal lags in the IC time-courses,
we cannot differentiate processes that show statistical dependencies and
therefore converge into a single IC, while their time-courses might reflect
functionally distinct processes. For example, the motor control compo-
nents IC2 and IC3 included primary motor and premotor regions, but also
other prefrontal areas such as IFC and pre-SMA. Given that these IC’s
were prominent in both tasks, it might be that the actual inhibition
network is still the same in both tasks, yet it receives input from different
functional systems, i.e. attentional allocation and action selection in the
GNGT and proactive inhibition system in the SST. Thus, the
inter-dependencies of the areas within the regions that contribute to each
component, as well as causal dependencies between different functional
networks should be the priority of future research to fully understand the
cascade of processes that ultimately result in suppressed action.
5. Conclusion
Based on the behavioral performance, EMG, and EEG-derived inde-
pendent component activity, we conclude that the most commonly used
response inhibition tasks, the GNGT and SST, recruit different brain
mechanisms with distinct temporal dynamics. In both tasks, there is a
contribution of early signal detection to successful suppression of a
response. In the GNGT, there is an early activation of the fronto-parietal
attentional system and only then in the motor control components,
resulting in a rather late inhibition at the peripheral level at around 316
ms. In the SST, there seems to be a significant contribution of the frontal
control components already prior to the stimulus detection steps and very
early changes in the motor control components. This is paralleled by
delayed go RTs and fast stopping as indexed via prEMG at around 140ms.
Thus, inhibition in the SST is achieved by proactive biasing of the sen-
sory-motor system in preparation for the stop signal, followed by a fast
reflexive inhibitory process within the motor system after the detection
of the stop stimulus. Our results do not agree with the notion of a unitary
construct of response inhibition and imply that subtle changes in the task
instructions can lead to marked changes in the underlying neurocognitive
processes. We further outlined the specific underlying mechanisms for
both tasks together with their temporal activity profiles, highlighting that
processes beyond the known inhibition network can contribute to action
cancellation through action selection or outright automatic stopping.
This implies caution when comparing different patient populations, as
deficits in behavioral performance may be misleadingly assigned to
deficient response inhibition.
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